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Abstract
Epistemic Logic Programs (ELPs), that is, Answer Set Pro-
gramming (ASP) extended with epistemic operators, have re-
ceived renewed interest in recent years, which led to a flurry
of new research, as well as efficient solvers. An important
question is under which conditions a sub-program can be re-
placed by another one without changing the meaning, in any
context. This problem is known as strong equivalence, and is
well-studied for ASP. For ELPs, this question has been ap-
proached by embedding them into epistemic extensions of
equilibrium logics. In this paper, we consider a simpler, more
direct characterization that is directly applicable to the lan-
guage used in state-of-the-art ELP solvers. This also allows us
to give tight complexity bounds, showing that strong equiva-
lence for ELPs remains coNP-complete, as for ASP. We fur-
ther use our results to provide syntactic characterizations for
tautological rules and rule subsumption for ELPs.
1 Introduction
Epistemic Logic Programs (ELPs) are an extension
of the well-established formalism of Answer Set Pro-
gramming (ASP), a generic, fully declarative logic
programming language that allows for encoding prob-
lems such that the resulting answers (called answer
sets) directly correspond to solutions of the en-
coded problem (Brewka, Eiter, and Truszczynski 2011;
Schaub and Woltran 2018). Negation in ASP is gener-
ally interpreted according to the stable model semantics
(Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988), that is, as negation-as-failure,
also called default negation. Such a default negation ¬a of
an atom a is true if there is no justification for a in the same
answer set, making it a “local” operator in the sense that it
is defined relative to one considered answer set. ELPs (in
the version of (Shen and Eiter 2016)), on the other hand,
extend ASP with the epistemic negation operator not that
allows for a form of meta-reasoning, that is, reasoning over
multiple answer sets. Intuitively, an epistemically negated
atom not a expresses that a cannot be proven true, meaning
that it is not true in every answer set. Thus, epistemic
negation is defined relative to a collection of answer sets,
referred to as a world view. Deciding whether a world view
exists, is Σ3
P
-complete (Shen and Eiter 2016), one level
higher on the polynomial hierarchy than deciding answer
set existence (Eiter and Gottlob 1995).
Gelfond (1991; 1994) recognized epistemic negation
as a desired construct for ASP early on and introduced
the modal operators K (“known” or “provably true”)
and M (“possible” or “not provably false”) to address
this. Ka and Ma correspond to ¬not a and not¬a,
respectively. Renewed interest in recent years has revealed
several flaws in the original semantics, and various new ap-
proaches (cf. e.g. (Gelfond 2011; Truszczynski 2011;
Kahl 2014; Farin˜as del Cerro, Herzig, and Su 2015;
Shen and Eiter 2016)) were proposed. Also the development
of ELP solving systems (Kahl et al. 2015; Son et al. 2017;
Bichler, Morak, and Woltran 2018) has gained momentum.
A main application and major motivation of ELPs is the
formalization of the Closed World Assumption (CWA), as
pointed out already by Gelfond (1991). Interestingly, there
are two formalizations of the CWA using ELPs in the litera-
ture. The first, given in (Gelfond 1991)1, shall be referred to
as Gelfond-CWA and introduces one rule for each atom p:
p′ ← ¬not¬p. (1)
Intuitively, this says that p′ (i.e. the negation of p) shall
be true if there is no possible world where p is true.
Shen and Eiter (2016) propose a different rule for CWA,
which we will refer to as Shen-Eiter-CWA for p:
p′ ← not p. (2)
Again, intuitively, this formulation makes p′ true iff there is
a possible world where p is false.
A natural question is whether (1) and (2) yield the same
results in any context, which will be answered in this paper.
To this end, we study notions of equivalence between ELPs.
For instance, two ELPs Π1 and Π2 are strongly ELP-WV-
equivalent iff, for any third ELP Π, the combined programs
Π1 ∪Π and Π2 ∪Π are equivalent (i.e. have the same world
views). This notion is useful to transform ELPs into equiv-
alent versions where one wants to verify that a local change
preserves equivalence without considering the whole pro-
gram. Other notions of strong equivalence can be defined for
comparing candidate world views (rather than world views)
1Gelfond (1991) proposed the rule ∼ p ← ¬Mp, where ∼
is a third kind of negation, usually referred to as strong negation,
not considered in this paper. It can be simulated by replacing oc-
currences of ∼ p by a fresh atom p′ and adding a constraint rule
← p, p′ that excludes p and p′ to hold simultaneously.
or considering only the addition of programs that do not con-
tain epistemic operators. In (plain) ASP, strong equivalence
is a well-studied problem. Lifschitz, Pearce, and Valverde
(2001) have provided an elegant characterization of the
problem in terms of Heyting’s logic of here-and-there
(HT). Strong equivalence also proved useful as a means
to simplify programs (Cabalar, Pearce, and Valverde 2007;
Lin and Chen 2007; Eiter et al. 2013).
It has been shown in (Wang and Zhang 2005) and
(Farin˜as del Cerro, Herzig, and Su 2015), among oth-
ers, that epistemic extensions of logic HT can be used
to characterize strong equivalence of ELPs. These ap-
proaches, however, are very general and lead to a very
abstract characterization that cannot be immediately
used for ELPs written in the language of current solving
systems. It is also not easy to obtain tight complexity
results in such a general setting. The semantics consid-
ered in (Wang and Zhang 2005) is the original one of
(Gelfond 1991), which is now considered obsolete, while
(Farin˜as del Cerro, Herzig, and Su 2015) consider a differ-
ent semantics from the one in (Shen and Eiter 2016), which
is what we use. An in-depth comparison of the differences
in the semantics can also be found in (Shen and Eiter 2016).
In this paper, we therefore propose a simpler, more di-
rect characterization for the well-understood ELP semantics
given in (Shen and Eiter 2016). Our characterization is in
the spirit of (Turner 2003), which is useful to study ELPs
written in the input language of the ELP solvers mentioned
above, as it can be directly applied in this setting. This also
allows us to obtain tight complexity bounds for checking
strong equivalence of ELPs. We further investigate several
use cases of strong equivalence by using our technique to
syntactically characterize tautological rules and rule sub-
sumptions.
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are
the following:
• We propose different notions of strong equivalence of
ELPs (based on the input language of ELP solvers) that
strictly generalize strong equivalence for plain ASP.
• We provide a model-theoretic characterization of strong
equivalence for ELPs showing that the different notions
proposed coincide.
• We use our characterization to show that, surprisingly,
testing strong equivalence of two ELPs remains in CONP,
that is, the complexity of this test does not increase when
considering ELPs instead of plain ASP.
• Finally, we use our proposed notion to syntactically char-
acterize tautological ELP rules and when one ELP rule
subsumes another.
2 Preliminaries
Answer Set Programming (ASP). A ground logic pro-
gram with nested negation (also called answer set program,
ASP program, or, simply, logic program) is a pair Π =
(A,R), whereA is a set of propositional (i.e. ground) atoms
andR is a set of rules of the form
a1 ∨ · · · ∨ al ← al+1, . . . , am,¬ℓ1, . . . ,¬ℓn; (3)
where the comma symbol stands for conjunction, 0 ≤ l ≤
m, 0 ≤ n, ai ∈ A for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and each ℓi
is a literal, that is, either an atom a or its (default) nega-
tion ¬a for any atom a ∈ A. Note that, therefore, doubly
negated atoms may occur. We will sometimes refer to such
rules as standard rules. Each rule r ∈ R of form (3) con-
sists of a head H (r) = {a1, . . . , al} and a body B(r) =
{al+1, . . . , am,¬ℓ1, . . . ,¬ℓn}. We denote the positive body
by B+(r) = {al+1, . . . , am}.
An interpretation I (over A) is a set of atoms, that is,
I ⊆ A. A literal ℓ is true in an interpretation I ⊆ A, denoted
I  ℓ, if a ∈ I and ℓ = a, or if a 6∈ I and ℓ = ¬a; otherwise
ℓ is false in I , denoted I 6 ℓ. Finally, for some literal ℓ, we
define that I  ¬ℓ if I 6 ℓ. This notation naturally extends
to sets of literals. An interpretation M is called a model of
r, denoted M  r, if, whenever M  B(r), it holds that
M  H (r). We denote the set of models of r by mods(r);
the models of a logic program Π = (A,R) are given by
mods(Π) =
⋂
r∈Rmods(r). We also write I  r (resp.
I  Π) if I ∈ mods(r) (resp. I ∈ mods(Π)).
The GL-reduct ΠI of a logic program Π = (A,R) with
respect to an interpretation I is the program (A,RI), where
RI = {H (r)← B+(r) | r ∈ R, ∀¬ℓ ∈ B(r) : I  ¬ℓ}.
Definition 1. (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988;
Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991;
Lifschitz, Tang, and Turner 1999) M ⊆ A is an an-
swer set of a logic program Π if (1)M ∈ mods(Π) and (2)
there is no subsetM ′ ⊂M such thatM ′ ∈ mods(ΠM ).
The set of answer sets of a logic programΠ is denoted by
AS(Π). The consistency problem of ASP, that is, to decide
whether for a given logic programΠ it holds that AS (Π) 6=
∅, is Σ2
P
-complete (Eiter and Gottlob 1995), and remains so
also in the case where doubly negated atoms are allowed in
rule bodies (Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009).
Strong Equivalence for Logic Programs. Two logic pro-
grams Π1 = (A,R1) and Π2 = (A,R2) are equivalent iff
they have the same set of answer sets, that is, AS (Π1) =
AS(Π2). The two logic programs are strongly equivalent iff
for any third logic program Π = (A,R) it holds that the
combined logic programΠ1 ∪ Π = (A,R1 ∪ R) is equiva-
lent to the combined logic programΠ2 ∪Π = (A,R2 ∪R).
Note that strong equivalence implies equivalence, since the
empty programΠ = (A, ∅) would already contradict strong
equivalence for two non-equivalent programs Π1 and Π2.
An SE-model (Turner 2003) of a logic program Π =
(A,R) is a tuple (X,Y ), where X ⊆ Y ⊆ A, Y  Π,
andX  ΠY . The set of SE-models of a logic program Π is
denoted SE(Π). Note that for every model Y of Π, (Y, Y )
is an SE-model of Π, since Y  Π implies that Y  ΠY .
Two logic programs (over the same atoms)
are strongly equivalent iff they have the same
SE-models (Lifschitz, Pearce, and Valverde 2001;
Turner 2003). Checking whether two logic programs
are strongly equivalent is CONP-complete (Turner 2003;
Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009).
Epistemic Logic Programs. An epistemic literal is a for-
mula not ℓ, where ℓ is a literal and not is the epistemic
negation operator. A ground epistemic logic program (ELP)
is a triple Π = (A, E ,R), where A is a set of propositional
atoms, E is a set of epistemic literals over the atoms A, and
R is a set of ELP rules, which are
a1 ∨ · · · ∨ ak ← ℓ1, . . . , ℓm, ξ1, . . . , ξj ,¬ξj+1, . . . ,¬ξn,
where each ai ∈ A is an atom, each ℓi is a literal, and each
ξi ∈ E is an epistemic literal. Note that usually E is defined
implicitly to be the set of all epistemic literals appearing in
the rulesR; however, making the domain of epistemic liter-
als explicit will prove useful for our purposes. The union of
two ELPs Π1 = (A1, E1,R1) and Π2 = (A2, E2,R2) is the
ELP Π1 ∪ Π2 = (A1 ∪A2, E1 ∪ E2,R1 ∪R2).
For a set E of epistemic literals, a subset Φ ⊆ E of
epistemic literals is called an epistemic guess (or, simply,
a guess). The following definition provides a way to check
whether a set of interpretations is compatible with a guessΦ.
Definition 2. LetA be a set of atoms, E be a set of epistemic
literals overA, and Φ ⊆ E be an epistemic guess. A set I of
interpretations over A is called Φ-compatible w.r.t. E , iff
1. I 6= ∅;
2. for each epistemic literal not ℓ ∈ Φ, there exists an inter-
pretation I ∈ I such that I 6 ℓ; and
3. for each epistemic literal not ℓ ∈ E \ Φ, for all interpre-
tations I ∈ I it holds that I  ℓ.
For an ELP Π = (A, E ,R), the epistemic reduct
(Shen and Eiter 2016) of the program Π w.r.t. a guess Φ,
denoted ΠΦ, consists of the rules RΦ = {r¬ | r ∈ R},
where r¬ is defined as the rule r ∈ R where all occur-
rences of epistemic literalsnot ℓ ∈ Φ are replaced by⊤, and
all remaining epistemic negation symbols not are replaced
by default negation ¬. Note that, after this transformation,
ΠΦ = (A,RΦ) is a logic program without epistemic nega-
tion2. This leads to the following, central definition.
Definition 3. Let Π = (A, E ,R) be an ELP. A set M of
interpretations over A is a candidate world view (CWV) of
Π if there is an epistemic guess Φ ⊆ E such that M =
AS(ΠΦ) andM is compatible with Φ w.r.t. E . The set of all
CWVs of an ELP Π is denoted by cwv(Π).
Let us reconsider the CWA formulations as examples.
Example 4. Let AC = {p, p′}, EC = {not p,not¬p},
ΠG = (AC , EC ,RG) with RG containing only rule (1),
and ΠS = (AC , EC ,RS) with RS containing only rule (2).
We obtain cwv (ΠG) = {{{p′}}} as guess Φ = {not p}
is compatible with AS (ΠΦG = {p
′ ← ¬p}) = {{p′}}, while
no other guesses are compatible with the answer sets of the
respective epistemic reducts. We also obtain cwv (ΠS) =
{{{p′}}} as Φ is compatible with AS(ΠΦS = {p
′ ← ⊤}) =
{{p′}}, while no other guesses are compatible with the an-
swer sets of the respective epistemic reducts.
2In fact, ΠΦ may contain triple-negated atoms ¬¬¬a.
But, according to the definition of the GL-reduct in
(Lifschitz, Tang, and Turner 1999), such formulas are equiva-
lent to simple negated atoms ¬a, and we treat them as such.
Following the principle of knowledge minimization,
Shen and Eiter (2016) define a world view as follows.
Definition 5. Let Π = (A, E ,R) be an ELP. C ∈ cwv(Π)
is called world view (WV) of Π if its associated guess Φ is
subset-maximal, i.e. there is no C′ ∈ cwv(Π) with associ-
ated guess Φ′ ⊃ Φ.
Note that in Example 4 there is only one CWV per pro-
gram; hence the associated guesses are subset-maximal, and
the sets of CWVs and WVs coincide.
One of the main reasoning tasks regarding ELPs is the
world view existence problem, that is, given an ELP Π, de-
cide whether a WV (or, equivalently, CWV) exists. This
problem is ΣP
3
-complete (Shen and Eiter 2016).
We close this section with a statement that shows that ex-
tendingA or E of an ELP does not change their CWVs (and
hence also not their WVs).
Theorem 6. Let Π = (A, E ,R) be an ELP and let Π′ =
(A′, E ′,R) be an ELP with the same set of rules, but with
A′ ⊃ A and E ′ ⊃ E . Then, cwv(Π) = cwv(Π′).
The proof can be found in Appendix A. The above theo-
rem implies that, given two ELPs Π1 = (A1, E1,R1) and
Π2 = (A2, E2,R2), we can always assume that A1 = A2
and E1 = E2 (since the domains can be extended without
changing the CWVs, as per the above theorem).
3 Strong Equivalence for ELPs
In this section, we will investigate notions of equivalence of
ELPs, in particular, focusing on how to extend the concept of
strong equivalence (Lifschitz, Pearce, and Valverde 2001;
Turner 2003) from logic programs to ELPs. We will start by
defining (ordinary) equivalence of two ELPs.
Definition 7. Two ELPs are WV-equivalent (resp. CWV-
equivalent) iff their WVs (resp. CWVs) coincide.
We observe that CWV-equivalence is the stronger notion,
as it immediately implies WV-equivalence. Moreover, for
two ELPs to be equivalent as defined above, not only must
the set of guesses leading to WVs/CWVs be the same, but
also the answer sets in each of these WVs/CWVs.
We now continue by defining strong equivalence for
ELPs. One motivation for such a kind of equivalence is mod-
ularization: we want to be able to replace a sub-program by
another one such that the semantics (i.e. WVs or CWVs)
of the overall program does not change. Based on the two
equivalence notions defined above and using ideas from
work done in the area of logic programs (Eiter et al. 2007),
we propose four notions of strong equivalence for ELPs.
Definition 8. Let Π1 and Π2 be two ELPs. Π1 and Π2 are
• strongly ELP-WV-equivalent iff, for every ELPΠ,Π1∪Π
and Π2 ∪ Π are WV-equivalent;
• strongly ASP-WV-equivalent iff, for every (plain) logic
program Π, Π1 ∪ Π and Π2 ∪ Π are WV-equivalent;
• strongly ELP-CWV-equivalent iff, for every ELP Π, Π1 ∪
Π and Π2 ∪ Π are CWV-equivalent;
• strongly ASP-CWV-equivalent iff, for every (plain) logic
program Π, Π1 ∪ Π and Π2 ∪ Π are CWV-equivalent.
Having defined these equivalence notions for ELPs, the
main aim of this section is to characterize strong equiva-
lence in a similar fashion as was done for logic programs
by Turner (2003). Note that one could be tempted to define
strong equivalence for ELPs simply in terms of Turner’s SE-
models of the epistemic reducts, for each possible epistemic
guess. However, this approach does not capture our inten-
tions, as the following example shows:
Example 9. Take the two ELPs Π1 = (A, E ,R1) andΠ2 =
(A, E ,R2) with R1 = {p ← not p}, R2 = {p ← ¬p}
and E = {not p}. Now, for the guess Φ1 = ∅, note that
ΠΦ11 = Π
Φ1
2 and hence, trivially, the SE-models are also
the same. However, for the guess Φ2 = E , Π
Φ2
1 consists of
the rule p ← ⊤, while ΠΦ22 reduces to p ← ¬p. It can be
checked that the SE-models of these two epistemic reducts
w.r.t. Φ2 are not the same, hence these two programs are not
strongly equivalent in the sense of (Turner 2003). However,
it turns out that the guess Φ2 can never give rise to a CWV,
since it requires that there is an answer set not containing
p, but both ΠΦ21 and Π
Φ2
2 require that p is true in all answer
sets of the CWV. Hence, it seems that the epistemic reducts
for Φ2 should not have any bearing on evaluating strong
equivalence.
The example above implies that, when establishing strong
equivalence for ELPs, we should discard guesses that can
never give rise to a CWV. We formalize this as follows:
Definition 10. Let I be a set of interpretations over a do-
main of atomsA, let E be a set of epistemic literals over A,
and Φ ⊆ E be a guess. Then, Φ is realizable in I iff there is
a subset I ′ ⊆ I such that I ′ is compatible with Φ w.r.t. E .
Given an ELP Π = (A, E ,R) and a guess Φ ⊆ E , we say
that Φ is realizable in Π iff Φ is realizable in the set of mod-
els of ΠΦ. We say that Φ is realizable in a set of SE-models
S iff Φ is realizable in the set {Y | (X,Y ) ∈ S}. We are
now ready to define our central construct, the SE-function
SEΠ of an ELP, which will be the key concept to character-
ize strong equivalence for ELPs. Note that realizability plays
an important role in this.
Definition 11. The SE-function SEΠ(·) of an ELP Π =
(A, E ,R) maps guesses Φ ⊆ E for Π to sets of SE-models
as follows.
SEΠ(Φ) =
{
SE(ΠΦ) if Φ realizable in Π
∅ otherwise.
Example 12. Recall that programs ΠG and ΠS of Exam-
ple 4 are both CWV- and WV-equivalent. However, we find
that their respective SE-functions differ: SEΠG({not p})
contains the tuple (∅, {p}), but SEΠS ({not p}) does not;
yet {not p} is realizable in both ΠG and ΠS .
Note that if Φ is realizable in Π, then {Y | (X,Y ) ∈
SEΠ(Φ)} = mods(ΠΦ). Before proceeding to our main re-
sults, we first state some observations that can bemade about
the SE-function of an ELP.
Lemma 13. Let Π = (A, E ,R) be an ELP with SEΠ its
SE-function. Further, letM be a set of interpretations, and
Φ ⊆ E be a guess. Then,M is a CWV of Π w.r.t. Φ iffM =
{Y | (Y, Y ) ∈ SEΠ(Φ),¬∃X ⊂ Y (X,Y ) ∈ SEΠ(Φ)}
andM is compatible with Φ.
Proof. The left-to-right direction can be shown as follows.
By definition of the SE-function it holds that for each CWV
M w.r.t. a guess Φ forΠ, SEΠ(Φ) contains the set {(Y, Y ) |
Y ∈ M}, and, since M contains only answer sets of
the epistemic reduct ΠΦ, there cannot be a pair (X,Y ) in
SEΠ(Φ) with X ⊂ Y . There also cannot be some other
pair (Y ′, Y ′) ∈ SEΠ(Φ) for which no pair (X ′, Y ′) with
X ′ ⊂ Y ′ exists, since then this would mean that Y ′ is an an-
swer set of ΠΦ, and therefore must be inM. Finally, since
by assumptionM is a CWV, it is compatible with Φ by def-
inition.
For the right-to-left direction, note that M clearly con-
tains all those sets of atoms Y that are models of ΠΦ, such
that there is no subset of Y model of the GL-reduct [ΠΦ]Y .
Hence,M contains precisely the answer sets of ΠΦ. Since,
by assumption, M is compatible with Φ, this immediately
implies thatM is a CWV of Π as per Definition 3.
The next statement is a direct consequence of the previous
lemma, since, as we have seen, the SE-function of an ELP
defines its CWVs.
Lemma 14. Programs with the same SE-function are CWV-
equivalent (and hence WV-equivalent).
We are now ready to state the main result of this section,
namely that the SE-function precisely characterizes strong
equivalence for ELPs.
Theorem 15. Let Π1 and Π2 be two ELPs. The following
statements are equivalent:
1. Π1 and Π2 are ELP-CWV-equivalent;
2. Π1 and Π2 are ASP-CWV-equivalent;
3. Π1 and Π2 are ELP-WV-equivalent;
4. Π1 and Π2 are ASP-WV-equivalent; and
5. SEΠ1 = SEΠ2 .
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2) ⇒ (4), (1) ⇒ (3) ⇒ (4). These follow
directly from Definition 8 and from the fact that every WV
is a CWV and every ASP program is an ELP.
(5) ⇒ (1). Assume that statement (5) holds. We need to
show that for any third program Π it holds that Π1 ∪ Π and
Π2 ∪Π are equivalent. To this end, pick any guess Φ. Then,
SEΠ1∪Π(Φ) =

SEΠ1(Φ) ∩ SEΠ(Φ) if Φ is realizable in
SEΠ1(Φ) ∩ SEΠ(Φ)
∅ otherwise


= SEΠ2∪Π(Φ),
since SEΠ1(Φ) = SEΠ2(Φ) by assumption, and thus
SEΠ1(Φ)∩SEΠ(Φ) = SEΠ2(Φ)∩SEΠ(Φ). Lemma 14 then
proves that Π1 ∪ Π and Π2 ∪ Π are equivalent.
(4) ⇒ (5). We will prove the contrapositive. Let Π1 =
(A1, E1,R1) and Π2 = (A2, E2,R2) be two ELPs and as-
sume, w.l.o.g., that A1 = A2 = A and E1 = E2 = E
(cf. Theorem 6). Further, let Φ ⊆ E be a guess such that
Y1 = SEΠ1(Φ) 6= SEΠ2(Φ) = Y2. Finally, assume that
there is a pair (X,Y ) in Y1 but not in Y2 (again, w.l.o.g.,
by symmetry). We need to show that there exists a logic pro-
gramΠ (i.e. without epistemic literals) such that the WVs of
the ELP Π1 ∪ Π differ from those of Π2 ∪ Π. We only need
to consider the case where Π1 and Π2 are WV-equivalent,
since the claim is trivially true otherwise.
By Definition 11, with Y1 non-empty by assumption,
there is a subset C ⊆ {Y | (X,Y ) ∈ Y1} compatible with
Φ, since Φ is realizable in Π. Let C = {Y1, . . . , Ym} and let
{Ym+1, . . . , Yn} = 2A \ C.
The idea is to construct Π in such a way that the potential
WV represented by C is actually realized in Π1 ∪Π. To con-
struct Π, let y1, . . . , yn be fresh atoms not occurring in A.
Let Π contain the rule y1 ∨ . . .∨ yn ← ⊤, and, furthermore,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and a ∈ Yi, the rule ⊥ ← yi,¬a, and
for all a ∈ A \ Yi, the rule ⊥ ← yi, a. This makes sure that
for every model Yi of Π
Φ
1 , the corresponding model Y
′
i of
(Π1 ∪ Π)
Φ contains the atom yi (i.e. Y
′
i = Yi ∪ {yi}).
Now, take the pair (X,Y ) that is, by assumption, con-
tained in Y1 (but not in Y2). Clearly, there is some integer
k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, such that Y = Yk . Now, for each model Yi,
1 ≤ i ≤ m, i 6= k, and each atom a ∈ Yi, add the rule
a ← yi to Π. For each model Yi, m < i ≤ n, i 6= k, add
the rule ⊥ ← yi to Π. This makes sure that, in (Π1 ∪ Π)Φ,
exactly the models from C (except Yk, if k ≤ m) become
answer sets, and all other models are destroyed, except for
the model Y = Yk, if k > m.
At this point, if we have that {Y1, . . . , Ym} 6⊆ mods(ΠΦ2 ),
we simply do the same as above also for the model Y = Yk
(i.e. realize Yk as an answer set if k ≤ m, or destroy Yk
in case k > m). Then, clearly, (Π1 ∪ Π)Φ will have the
answer sets {Y1∪{y1}, . . . , Ym∪{ym}}which form a CWV
of Π1 ∪ Π, but not of Π2 ∪ Π. Since all other models are
destroyed, independent of the guess Φ, this CWV is actually
the only CWV of Π1 ∪ Π, and hence, it is a WV, proving
our claim that Π1 ∪ Π and Π2 ∪ Π are not WV-equivalent
(⋆). It therefore remains to show the claim for the case where
the set {Y1, . . . , Ym} ⊆ mods(ΠΦ2 ). To this end, we need to
distinguish the following two cases:
Case (1). Assume that Y 6 ΠΦ2 . In this case, for each atom
a ∈ Y , add the rule a ← yk to Π. Now, Y ∪ {yk} is an
answer set of (Π1 ∪ Π)Φ, but not of (Π2 ∪Π)Φ = ΠΦ2 ∪ Π.
Case (2). Assume that Y  ΠΦ2 . In this case, for each atom
a ∈ X , add the rule a ← yk to Π, and, in addition, for all
atoms a, b ∈ Y \ X , add the rule a ← b, yk to Π. We will
show that, in this case, Y is an answer set of (Π2 ∪ Π)Φ,
but not of (Π1 ∪ Π)Φ. Since Y  ΠΦ2 and every model of
a program is also a model of its GL-reduct, by definition
of SE-models we know that Y 6= X , since, by assumption,
(X,Y ) ∈ Y1 but (X,Y ) 6∈ Y2. Since (X,Y ) ∈ Y1, we have
thatX  [ΠΦ1 ]
Y . But then, by construction of Π it holds that
X ∪ {yk}  [(Π1 ∪Π)Φ]Y = [ΠΦ1 ]
Y ∪ [ΠΦ]Y and therefore
Y ∪ {yk} is not an answer set of (Π1 ∪ Π)Φ. On the other
hand, for (Π2∪Π)Φ, assume that there is someX ′ ⊂ Y such
thatX ′ ∪ {yk}  [(Π2 ∪Π)Φ]Y . Clearly, by construction of
Π, X ⊂ X ′. Thus, there is some atom a in X ′ ⊆ Y but not
inX . But, by construction of Π, we then have thatX ′ = Y .
Hence, Y ∪ {yk} is an answer set of (Π2 ∪Π)Φ, as desired.
The above shows that, for both cases (1) and (2), the set
C′ = {Y1 ∪ {y1}, . . . , Ym ∪ {ym}} is the set of answer sets
of one of the two programs (Π1 ∪ Π)Φ and (Π2 ∪ Π)Φ, and
therefore, by assumption, a CWV of that program. But, by
construction of Π, C′ cannot be a CWV for the other pro-
gram (because Y ∪ {yk} is an answer set of one of the
two programs, but not both, and hence distinguishes the
CWVs)3. It remains to show that C′ is not only a CWV but
also a WV of exactly one of the two programs, which can be
done via the argument for (⋆). This concludes the proof.
The above theorem states that the SE-function precisely
characterizes all the notions of strong equivalence for ELPs
and that these notions are all equivalent. We therefore will,
from now on, jointly refer to these four equivalent notions as
strong equivalence. The next statement follows immediately.
Corollary 16. ELPs are strongly equivalent iff they have the
same SE-function.
Example 17. Continuing from Example 12, we observe
that the difference in the SE-function can be made mani-
fest by combining the two programs with the program Π =
(AC , EC ,R), where R = {p ← ¬p′}. We observe that
cwv(ΠG ∪ Π) = {{{p}}} (due to guess {not p}) and
cwv(ΠS ∪ Π) = {{{p′}}} (due to guess {not¬p}).
We close this section by showing that our definition of
strong equivalence for ELPs generalizes the established no-
tion of strong equivalence for logic programs.
Corollary 18. Let Π1 = (A,R1) and Π2 = (A,R2) be
two logic programs, and let Π′1 = (A, ∅,R1) and Π
′
2 =
(A, ∅,R2) be two ELPs with the same sets of rules as Π1
and Π2, respectively. Then, Π1 and Π2 are strongly equiva-
lent iff Π′1 and Π
′
2 are.
Proof. (Sketch) For Π′1 and Π
′
2 there is only one possible
guess, namely, Φ = ∅. Moreover, in this setting it holds that
SEΠ(∅) = SE(Π) for any ELP Π: the crucical observation
is that SE(Π) is compatible with Φ w.r.t. the empty domain
of epistemic literals, exactly if SE(Π) 6= ∅.
4 Complexity of ELP Strong Equivalence
We now make use of our characterization to settle the com-
putational complexity of deciding strong equivalence be-
tween ELPs. The following lemma shows that to check the
realizability of a guess Φ for a given ELP Π it suffices to
consider a polynomially-sized subset of the models of Π.
Lemma 19. Let Π = (A, E ,R) be an ELP, Φ ⊆ E a guess
for Π, and Y = SEΠ(Φ) be non-empty. Then, there is a set
C ⊆ {Y | (X,Y ) ∈ Y} of polynomial size in Π that is
compatible with Φ w.r.t. E .
Proof. According to Definition 11, since Φ is realizable in
Π, there is a subset Y ′ ⊆ Y , such that the set C′ = {Y |
(X,Y ) ∈ Y ′} is compatible with Φ. By Definition 2, for
3Note that, in particular, in case (1), C′ is a CWV of Π1∪Π but
not of Π2 ∪ Π, and in case (2), the same holds if k ≤ m, and the
reverse holds if k > m.
each not ℓ ∈ E , when Φ contains not ℓ, there is a Ynot ℓ ∈
C′ such that ℓ is false in Ynot ℓ. Take the subset C ⊆ C′
containing Ynot ℓ for each not ℓ ∈ E , or, if Φ = ∅, let C be
any singleton subset of C′. Note that C is of polynomial size
in Π. Clearly, C is also compatible with Φ.
With this crucial observation in place, we are now ready
to state the complexity of checking strong equivalence for
ELPs, which remains in CONP as for plain logic programs.
This is surprising, since reasoning tasks for ELPs generally
are one level higher on the polynomial hierarchy than the
corresponding tasks for logic programs (cf. Section 2).
Theorem 20. Checking whether two ELPs are strongly
equivalent is CONP-complete.
Proof. We give a non-deterministic polynomial time pro-
cedure for checking that two ELPs are not strongly equiv-
alent, that is, that there is a difference in their respective
SE-functions. W.l.o.g. let Π1 = (A, E ,R1) and Π2 =
(A, E ,R2). The procedure works as follows:
1. Guess an epistemic guess Φ ⊆ E .
2. Guess a polynomially-sized, non-empty set of interpreta-
tions C overA, compatible with Φ.
3. Verify in polynomial time that each Y ∈ C is a model of
both ΠΦ1 and Π
Φ
2 . If not, REJECT.
4. Guess a pair (X,Y ) withX ⊆ Y ⊆ A.
5. Verify in polynomial time that (X,Y ) ∈ SEΠ1(Φ) but
(X,Y ) 6∈ SEΠ2(Φ) or vice versa. If so, ACCEPT. If not,
REJECT.
Clearly, the above procedure terminates in polynomial
time, since it is known that model checking for SE-models
can be done in polynomial time (Eiter et al. 2007). To ob-
tain correctness, it is not difficult to verify that the above
procedure is sound and complete given the following two
observations. Firstly, note that Lemma 19 implies that we
only need to focus on polynomially sized subsets when
evaluating the realizability of a guess as stated in Defini-
tion 11; hence guessing a polynomially sized set of inter-
pretations is enough in step 2. Secondly, assume that two
programs Π1 and Π2 have differing SE-functions. Then this
means that there must be some guess Φ, such that both sets
SEΠ1(Φ) and SEΠ2(Φ) are non-empty (clearly, as otherwise
SEΠ1(Φ) = SEΠ2(Φ) = ∅ for all guesses Φ). But, by Defi-
nition 11, this means that both sets contain a potential CWV.
Now there are two cases: either they do not share any poten-
tial CWVs, or if they do, then there is at least one SE-model
(X,Y ) contained in one but not both of the two sets.
Corollary 18 allows us to inherit the CONP
lower bound from the case of logic programs
(Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009), which completes
the proof.
5 Case Studies
In this section, we apply our characterisation to investigate
basic principles for simplifying ELPs.
Tautological Rules
Tautological rules are rules that can simply be removed from
any program without affecting its outcome.
Definition 21. An ELP rule r is tautological iff the single-
rule ELP Πr = (A, E , {r}) is strongly equivalent to the
empty program Π∅ = (A, E , ∅).
Let E be a set of epistemic literals overA. We say that an
epistemic guessΦ ⊆ E is consistent iff, whenever E contains
both not a and not¬a for some atom a ∈ A, it holds that
Φ contains at least one of {nota,not¬a}.4 Moreover, let
SA denote the set of all pairs (X,Y ) such thatX ⊆ Y ⊆ A.
Lemma 22. An ELP rule r is tautological iff for the single-
rule ELP Πr = (A, E , {r}) it holds that SEΠr (Φ) = SA for
each consistent guess Φ ⊆ E .
Proof. This follows from the fact that for the empty program
Π∅ = (A, E , ∅), SEΠ∅(Φ) = SA for each consistent guess
Φ ⊆ E , and the observation that if SE(ΠΦ) = SA, then Φ is
realizable in Π.
Before syntactically characterizing tautological ELP
rules, we recall a corresponding result for standard ASP
rules from the literature. For convenience, we shall denote
ASP rules of the form (3) as
A← B,¬C,¬¬D, (4)
using sets of atoms A, B, C, and D as is common practice.
In what follows, we denote single-rule logic programs con-
sisting of a rule r by Πr = (A,R) with R = {r} and call
r tautological if Πr is strongly equivalent to the empty pro-
gram Π = (A, ∅), i.e. SE(Πr) = SA. The following result
is due to (Cabalar, Pearce, and Valverde 2007, Lemma 2).
Lemma 23. A rule r of the form (4) is tautological iff (α)
A ∩B 6= ∅, (β) B ∩ C 6= ∅, or (γ) C ∩D 6= ∅.
We are now ready to characterize tautological ELP rules.
For the sake of presentation let us write them as
A← B,¬C,notD,not¬E,¬notF,¬not¬G, (5)
where, again, each capital letter represents a set of atoms,
analogously to ASP rules of the form (4). Note that D here
plays a different role than in (4); this is due to the fact that
in ELP rules we have no explicit double negation.
Let us also consider the notion of epistemic reduct w.r.t.
the above notation. Analogously to the ASP case, let Πr =
(A, E ,R) be the single-rule ELP with R = {r}. Now, for
Φ ⊆ E , we have ΠΦr = (A, E ,R
Φ) withRΦ = ∅ if not f ∈
Φ for some f ∈ F or if not¬g ∈ Φ for g ∈ G; otherwise,
RΦ = {rΦ} = {A← B,¬C,¬DΦ,¬¬EΦ,¬¬F,¬G}
with DΦ = {d ∈ D,not d /∈ Φ}, EΦ = {e ∈ E,not¬e /∈
Φ}. We are now ready to give our full syntactical charac-
terization of tautological ELP rules. It shows that deciding
whether a rule is tautological amounts to a simple syntactic
check and can be done individually, for each rule.
4Clearly, ifΦ contains neither of the two epistemic literals, then
Φ can never be realizable in any ELP, since there is no (non-empty)
set of models where a is both always true and always false.
Theorem 24. An ELP rule r of form (5) is tautological iff
(a) A ∩ B 6= ∅, (b) B ∩ (C ∪ G) 6= ∅, (c) C ∩ F 6= ∅, (d)
D ∩ F 6= ∅, (e) E ∩G 6= ∅, or (f) F ∩G 6= ∅.
Proof. Let Πr = (A, E ,R) be the single-rule ELP with
R = {r}, and, for an epistemic guess Φ, let rΦ denote the
unqiue rule inRΦ in case RΦ 6= ∅.
(⇒) Let r be an ELP rule satisfying at least one of the con-
ditions (a)–(f), and let Φ ⊆ E be a consistent guess. By
Lemma 22, we have to show that either RΦ = ∅ or that rΦ
fulfills the conditions of Lemma 23. This can be easily ver-
ified for conditions (a)–(c). For (d), note that if not f ∈ Φ
for some f ∈ F we get RΦ = ∅; otherwise for all f ∈ F it
holds that not f /∈ Φ, and thus that D ∩ F 6= ∅, and it fol-
lows that f ∈ DΦ for some f ∈ F . Hence we have ¬f and
¬¬f in rΦ, which is tautological as per Lemma 23, condi-
tion (γ). The argument is similar for (e), Finally, for (f) note
that since Φ is consistent, it must contain one of nota and
not¬a for each a ∈ F ∩G. It follows thatRΦ = ∅.
(⇐) Let r be an ELP rule such that none of (a)–(f) hold. Let
Φ = E\(notF∪not¬G). Φ is consistent since (f) does not
hold. Moreover,notD∪not¬E ⊆ Φ (since neither (d) nor
(e) holds). Suppose,Φ is realizable inΠr. By construction of
Φ, RΦ = {A ← B,¬C,¬¬F,¬G}; by Lemma 23 and the
fact that (α)–(γ) of that lemma do not hold for rΦ, we have
that rΦ is not tautological, i.e. SE(ΠrΦ) 6= SA, and thus
SEΠr (Φ) 6= SA. Otherwise, we get SEΠr (Φ) = ∅. Hence,
for both cases, r is not tautological by Lemma 22.
Rule Subsumption
Rule subsumption identifies when a rule s can safely be re-
moved from a programΠ, given another rule r is in Π.
Definition 25. An ELP rule s is subsumed by an ELP rule r
iff Πr is strongly equivalent to Πr ∪ Πs.
The next result follows from the definition of the SE-
function for a union of two ELPs (cf. proof of Theorem 15).
Lemma 26. An ELP rule s is subsumed by an ELP rule r iff,
for ELPs Πr = (A, E , {r}) and Πs = (A, E , {s}), it holds
that SEΠr (Φ) ⊆ SEΠs(Φ), for all guesses Φ ⊆ E .
Clearly, a tautological rule s is subsumed by any other
rule, hence in what follows we focus on subsumption of
non-tautological rules only. Again, we exploit known re-
sults from ASP. With some abuse of terminology, we say
that an ASP rule r subsumes another such rule s iff Πr =
(A, {r}) is strongly equivalent to Πr,s = (A, {r, s}),
i.e. iff SE(Πr) ⊆ SE(Πs). We first adapt a result from
(Cabalar, Pearce, and Valverde 2007, Theorem 7) to our no-
tation.
Lemma 27. An ASP rule r = A← B,¬C,¬¬D subsumes
a non-tautological ASP rule s = A′ ← B′,¬C′,¬¬D′ iff
the following conditions jointly hold: (α) A ⊆ A′ ∪ C′, (β)
B ⊆ B′ ∪D′, (β’) if A ∩ (A′ \ C′) 6= ∅ then B ⊆ B′, (γ)
C ⊆ C′, and (δ)D ⊆ B′ ∪D′.
We can now give a syntactic criterion for ELP rule sub-
sumption, which turns out to be somewhat involved, but still
feasible to check. It requires two technical notions that link a
rule r to a rule s whenever r has sufficiently many elements
that are not “absorbed” by default-negated epistemic literals
in s.
We are now ready to give our syntactic characterization.
Theorem 28. Let r be an ELP-rule of form (5) and s =
A′ ← B′,¬C′,notD′,not¬E′,¬notF ′,¬not¬G′ be
non-tautological. Furthermore, let r  s denote that |(A ∪
C ∪ D) \G′| > 1 or (B ∪ E) \ F ′ 6= ∅, and r  s denote
that (A ∪ C ∪D) \G′ 6= ∅ or |(B ∪E) \ F ′| > 1.
Then, r subsumes s iff the following conditions jointly hold:
(a) A ⊆ A′ ∪ C′ ∪D′ ∪G′;
(a∗) if r  s then A ⊆ A′ ∪ C′ ∪G′;
(b) B ⊆ B′ ∪ E′ ∪ F ′;
(b∗) if r  s then B ⊆ B′ ∪ F ′;
(b’) if A ∩ (A′ \ (C′ ∪D′ ∪G′)) 6= ∅ then B ⊆ B′;
(b∗’) if r  s and A ∩ (A′ \ (C′ ∪G′)) 6= ∅ then B ⊆ B′;
(c) C ∪D ⊆ C′ ∪D′ ∪G′;
(c∗) if r  s then C ⊆ C′ ∪G′;
(d) E ⊆ B′ ∪ E′ ∪ F ′;
(e) F ⊆ F ′ andG ⊆ G′.
Note that, in the above, items (a)–(d) generalize the same
items in Lemma 27, and the proof for those parts is a gen-
eralization of the proof of that lemma. The full proof can be
found in Appendix B.
Interestingly, applying the above theorem shows, for ex-
ample, that r = p← not p subsumes s = p← ¬p and vice
versa (in particular, since neither r  s nor s  r), showing
that the two programs in Example 9 are strongly equivalent.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, a simple characterization of strong equiva-
lence for epistemic logic programs was proposed, which
also demonstrates that various notions of strong equivalence
coincide. The characterization generalizes strong equiva-
lence for plain logic programs, and, somewhat unexpect-
edly, shows that checking strong equivalence for ELPs is not
harder than for ASP in terms of computational complexity.
The results also give rise to a syntactic characterization of
tautological ELP rules and ELP rule subsumption.
As another byproduct, we studied the relationship be-
tween two formalizations of CWA, Gelfond-CWA and Shen-
Eiter-CWA, as our running example. Indeed, while they
are (ordinarily) equivalent, they are not strongly equiva-
lent, as shown in Examples 12 and 17. In particular, Ex-
ample 17 shows that, combining Π in that example with
the Shen-Eiter-CWA rule, yields the world view {{p′}},
which does not seem intuitive in this setting. However, in
(Shen and Eiter 2016), it seems that the CWA rule is pro-
posed for Reiter’s CWA (Reiter 1977), and thus was not in-
tended to work with rules containing default negation.
For future work, we want to apply our findings
to obtain a normal form for ELPs, as was done
for ASP in (Cabalar, Pearce, and Valverde 2007). Further-
more, we plan to study weaker forms of equivalence
(Eiter, Fink, and Woltran 2007) for ELPs. In particular, it
will be interesting to see whether our notion of SE-functions
can be similarly re-used for characterizing uniform equiva-
lence like SE-models did serve as a basis for UE-models.
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A Proof of Theorem 6
We start by re-stating a folklore result from the world of
ASP, namely that the universe of atoms of a logic program
can be extended without changing its answer sets.
Proposition 29. LetΠ = (A,R) be a logic program and let
Π′ = (A′,R) be a logic program with the same set of rules,
but with A′ ⊃ A. Then, AS(Π) = AS (Π′).
It is easy to see that the above proposition holds by noting
that any atom a ∈ A′ \ A can clearly not appear in the rules
R, and hence any such a must be false in any answer set of
Π′ (i.e. for allM ∈ AS (Π′) it holds that a 6∈M ). From this
result, it is easy to obtain a similar result for ELPs.
Proposition 30. LetΠ = (A, E ,R) be an ELP and letΠ′ =
(A′, E ,R) be an ELP with the same set of rules and domain
of epistemic literals, but with A′ ⊃ A. Then, cwv(Π) =
cwv(Π′).
Proof. Note that, clearly, any atom a ∈ A′\A cannot appear
anywhere in R or E . Hence, for every guess Φ ⊆ E , a also
does not appear in the rules of the epistemic reduct Π′Φ and
thus also not in any answer set ofΠ′Φ. But then,AS(Π′Φ) =
AS(ΠΦ).
From the above, we can see that the atom domain of an
ELP can be arbitrarily extendedwithout changing the CWVs
of the ELP. We will now show that the same is the case for
the domain of epistemic literals.
Proposition 31. Let Π = (A, E ,R) be an ELP and let
Π′ = (A, E ′,R) be an ELP with the same set of rules and
atom domain, but with E ′ ⊃ E and E ′ \ E = {not ℓ}. Then,
cwv(Π) = cwv(Π′).
Proof. Note that the epistemic literal not ℓ cannot appear
anywhere in R, but the atom in ℓ can be in A and appear in
R. Now consider any guess Φ ⊆ E , which we will relate to
Φ′ = Φ ∪ {not ℓ}. The rules of the epistemic reducts ΠΦ,
Π′Φ, and Π′Φ
′
coincide, thus AS (ΠΦ) = AS(Π′Φ
′
) = M.
First, consider the case thatM is not compatible withΦ, it is
not hard to see that thenM is not compatible with Φ′ either.
Now assume that M is compatible with Φ, and thus M ∈
cwv(Π). We distinguish two cases: (1) ∀M ∈ M : M  ℓ,
in this case Φ is compatible withM (with respect to E ′) and
therefore M ∈ cwv(Π′); (2) ∃M ∈ M : M 6 ℓ, in this
case Φ′ is compatible withM and thusM ∈ cwv (Π′).
From Propositions 30 and 31 in that order, and their re-
spective proofs, Theorem 6 follows.
B Proof of Theorem 28
LetΠr = (A, E ,Rr) andΠs = (A, E ,Rs) be the two single
rule ELPs with Rr = {r} and Rs = {s}, and let rΦ and
sΦ be as in the previous section (cf. the paragraph before
Theorem 24).
(⇐) Let r, s be such that (a)–(e) hold. By Lemma 26 we need
to show that SEΠr (Φ) ⊆ SEΠs(Φ), for all guesses Φ ⊆ E .
If Φ is not consistent SEΠr (Φ) ⊆ SEΠs(Φ) holds by trivial
means. Hence, let Φ ⊆ E be consistent. If ΠΦs = ∅, we get
SEΠs(Φ) = SA and are done. So suppose Π
Φ
s 6= ∅. By (e)
and definition of the epistemic reduct, it follows that ΠΦr 6=
∅. We next show that either Φ is not realizable in Πr (hence,
SEΠr(Φ) = ∅ and SEΠr (Φ) ⊆ SEΠs(Φ) obviously holds)
or rΦ and sΦ apply to conditions (α)–(δ) of Lemma 27. In
the latter case, due to this lemma then SE(ΠΦr ) ⊆ SE(Π
Φ
s ),
and it remains to show that SEΠr (Φ) ⊆ SEΠs(Φ). To-
wards a contradiction suppose this inclusion does not hold.
In the light of SE(ΠΦr ) ⊆ SE(Π
Φ
s ), it must be the case that
SEΠr(Φ) = SE(Π
Φ
r ) and SEΠs(Φ) = ∅, i.e. Φ is not re-
alizable in ΠΦs . By definition this means that there is no
subset of mods(ΠΦs ) that is compatible with Φ. However,
since SE(ΠΦr ) ⊆ SE(Π
Φ
s ), it also follows thatmods(Π
Φ
r ) ⊆
mods(ΠΦs ). Hence, Φ cannot be realizable in Π
Φ
r either and
thus SEΠr (Φ) = ∅; a contradiction.
We continue to show that either Φ is not realizable in Πr,
or rΦ and sΦ fulfill the conditions (α)–(δ) of Lemma 27.
Recall that we assume that rΦ and sΦ exist, i.e. the epis-
temic reducts are not empty. Hence, Φ ⊆ E \ (notF ′ ∪
not¬G′). In fact, the epistemic reducts are of the form
rΦ = A ← B,¬C,¬DΦ,¬¬EΦ,¬¬F,¬G and sΦ =
A′ ← B′,¬C′,¬D′Φ,¬¬E′Φ,¬¬F ′,¬G′, where for ∆ ∈
{D,D′} we let ∆Φ = {d ∈ ∆ | notd /∈ Φ}, and for
Γ ∈ {E,E′} we let ΓΦ = {e ∈ Γ | not¬e /∈ Φ}.
We first show that condition (δ) of Lemma 27 holds for
rΦ and sΦ. Observe that for each e ∈ EΦ with e ∈ E′, also
e ∈ E′Φ. Hence from (d) we get EΦ ⊆ B′ ∪ E′Φ ∪ F ′ and
using F ⊆ F ′ from (e) we observeEΦ∪F ⊆ B′∪E′Φ∪F ′
as desired.
We continue with condition (γ) of Lemma 27. Suppose
it does not hold for rΦ and sΦ. We have to show that
SEΠr(Φ) = ∅. Since the condition does not hold for r
Φ
and sΦ, we have C ∪ DΦ ∪ G 6⊆ C′ ∪ D′Φ ∪ G′. Since
G ⊆ G′ by (e), C ∪ DΦ ⊆ C′ ∪ D′Φ ∪ G′. Note that
DΦ ⊆ C′ ∪ D′Φ ∪ G′ follows from (c) and the fact that
for each d ∈ DΦ with d ∈ D′, also d ∈ D′Φ. Thus
C 6⊆ C′ ∪D′Φ ∪G′. Let c ∈ C \ (C′ ∪D′Φ ∪G′). Since we
assume by (c) C ⊆ C′∪D′∪G′, we have two observations:
(i) not c ∈ Φ (otherwise c ∈ D′Φ); (ii) due to condition
(c∗), we need that r 6 s, since otherwise C ⊆ C′ ∪ G′
would hold. From r 6 s, it follows that there is neither an
element in (A ∪ C ∪D) \ G′ that is different from c nor is
there an element in B ∪ E different from F ′. We show that
no subset of models of rΦ is Φ-compatible. First, observe
that we would need for each such model that all f ∈ F ′ are
set ot true and all g ∈ G′ are set to false. Since not c ∈ Φ,
we need among those models one that sets c to false. How-
ever, such a model does not exist: the only “positive” atoms
in rΦ besides c occur also in G′ and are already set to false;
all “negative” atoms in rΦ are also in F ′ and thus are set to
true. Hence, SEΠr (Φ) = ∅.
Next, we treat condition (β) of Lemma 27. Suppose it
does not hold for rΦ and sΦ. Again, we need to show
SEΠr(Φ) = ∅. Since the condition does not hold for r
Φ and
sΦ, we haveB 6⊆ B′∪E′Φ∪F ′. Let b ∈ B\(B′∪E′Φ∪F ′).
Since we assume by (b)B ⊆ B′∪E′ ∪F ′, we have two ob-
servations: (i) not¬b ∈ Φ (otherwise b ∈ E′Φ); (ii) due to
condition (b∗), we need r 6 s since otherwise B ⊆ B′ ∪F ′
would hold. From r 6 s, it follows that there is neither an
element in (B ∪ E) \ F ′ that is different from b nor is there
an element in A∪C∪D different fromG′. We show that no
subset of models of rΦ is Φ-compatible. First, observe that
we would need for each such model that all f ∈ F ′ are set
ot true and all g ∈ G′ are set to false. Since not¬b ∈ Φ,
we need among those models one that sets b to true. How-
ever, such a model does not exist: all “positive” atoms in rΦ
occur also in G′ and are already set to false; the only “neg-
ative” atoms in rΦ different to b are also in F ′ and thus are
set to true. Hence, SEΠr (Φ) = ∅.
For Condition (β’) of Lemma 27, once more suppose that
is does not hold for rΦ and sΦ. We haveX = A∩(A′\(C′∪
D′Φ ∪G′)) 6= ∅ andB 6⊆ B′. It follows that A∩ (A′ \ (C′ ∪
G′)) 6= ∅, and, since (b∗’) holds, r 6 s. On the other hand,
since (b’) holds, we know that for each x ∈ X , x ∈ D′ and,
hence notx ∈ Φ (sinceX does not contain an element from
D′Φ). Fix some a ∈ X . From r 6 s it follows that there is
neither an element in (A ∪ C ∪ D) \ G′ that is different
from a nor is there an element in B ∪ E different from F ′.
We show that no subset of models of rΦ is Φ-compatible.
First, observe that we would need for each such model that
all f ∈ F ′ are set ot true and all g ∈ G′ are set to false.
Since not a ∈ Φ, we need among those models one that
sets a to false. However, such a model does not exist: the
only “positive” atoms in rΦ besides a occur also in G′ and
are already set to false; all “negative” atoms in rΦ are also
in F ′ and thus are set to true. Hence, SEΠr (Φ) = ∅.
It remains to show that condition (α) of Lemma 27 ap-
plies to rΦ and sΦ. The argument is similar to the one for
condition (γ). So, suppose the condition does not hold for
rΦ and sΦ, i.e. we have A 6⊆ A′ ∪ C′ ∪ D′Φ ∪ G′. Let
a ∈ A \ (A ∪ C′ ∪ D′Φ ∪ G′). Due to assumption (a), (i)
not a ∈ Φ (otherwise a ∈ D′Φ); (ii) r 6 s, since otherwise
A ⊆ A′∪C′∪G′ via assumption (a∗). From r 6 s, it follows
that there is neither an element in (A∪C∪D)\G′ that is dif-
ferent from a nor is there an element inB∪E different from
F ′. Showing that no subset of models of rΦ is Φ-compatible
follows essentially the same arguments as used for condition
(c) above. Hence, we end up with SEΠr (Φ) = ∅ as desired.
This concludes the proof of the only-if direction.
(⇒) Suppose one of the conditions (a)–(e) is violated. We
show that there exists a guess Φ, such that SEΠr (Φ) 6⊆
SEΠs(Φ).
Let us first consider (e) is violated and let Φ = E \
(notF ′ ∪ not¬G′). We get rΦ = ∅ and thus SEΠr (Φ) =
SA, while s
Φ = A′ ← B′,¬C′,¬¬F ′,¬G′ (note that
D′ and E′ dissappear since we assume s to be non-
tautological). It can be checked that, since s is non-
tautological, so is sΦ, and thus SEΠs(Φ) ⊂ SA. For the
remaining cases, let us assume (e) holds. Note that then
rΦ is non-empty as well. In fact, it is of the form rΦ =
A← B,¬C,¬DΦ,¬¬EΦ,¬¬F,¬G with DΦ = {d ∈ D |
not d /∈ Φ} and EΦ = {e ∈ E | not¬e /∈ Φ}.
First, suppose (d) is violated. We consider Ψ = Φ \
{not¬e} with e ∈ E \ (B′ ∪ E′ ∪ F ′). Since Ψ ⊆ Φ,
rΨ and sΨ are non-empty. In fact, sΨ = sΦ since e /∈ E′.
Moreover in rΨ we have e ∈ EΨ. We observe that condition
(δ) of Lemma 27 is violated, and, from the same lemma,
we get that SE(ΠΨr ) 6⊆ SE(Π
Ψ
s ). It remains to show that
mods(ΠΨr ) realizes Ψ. Note that any interpretation that sets
e to false is a model of rΨ. We thus take I as the set of in-
terpretations where e is set to false, all f ∈ F ′ are set to
true, and all g ∈ G′ are set to false. Indeed, I ⊆ mods(rΨ)
since I is a set of well-formed interpretations (recall that
e /∈ F ′, and F ′ ∩ G′ = ∅ since we assumed s to be non-
tautological). We show that the three conditions for I be-
ing Ψ-compatible hold. (i) I 6= ∅ by definition; (ii) for any
not ℓ ∈ Ψ, there exists an I ∈ I, such that I 6 ℓ: by defi-
nition ℓ /∈ {¬e} ∪ F ′ ∪ ¬G′. For ℓ = e, I 6 e hold for all
I ∈ I. Similary this is true for ℓ ∈ ¬F ′ and for all ℓ ∈ G′.
For all other ℓ such that not ℓ ∈ Ψ, there is one I ∈ I such
that I 6 ℓ by construction of I; (iii) we show that for any
not ℓ ∈ E \ Ψ, and for each each I ∈ I, I  ℓ. Indeed, by
construction of Ψ, ℓ is either ¬e, f ∈ F ′ or ¬g ∈ ¬G′; by
definition, for each I ∈ I it holds that I  ℓ.
Suppose (c) is violated. We consider Ψ = Φ \ {not c}
with c ∈ (C∪D)\ (C′∪D′∪G′). SinceΨ ⊆ Φ, rΨ and sΨ
are non-empty. In fact, sΨ = sΦ since c /∈ D′. Moreover in
rΨ we have c ∈ DΨ, for the case c /∈ C. Thus, c ∈ C ∪DΨ.
We observe that condition (γ) of Lemma 27 is thus violated,
and, by the same lemma, we get that SE(ΠΨr ) 6⊆ SE(Π
Ψ
s ). It
remains to show that Ψ is realizable in mods(ΠΨr ). Indeed,
any interpretation that sets c to true is a model of rΨ. We take
I as the set of interpretations where c is set to true, all f ∈
F ′ are set to true, and all g ∈ G′ are set to false. As before,
one can show that I is a set of well-formed interpretations
(in paricular, since c /∈ G′) and Ψ-compatible.
Suppose (c∗) is violated, i.e. we have |(A∪C∪D)\G′| >
1 or (B∪E)\F ′ 6= ∅, butC 6⊆ C′∪G′. Let c ∈ C\(C′∪G′).
Hence, (1) there exists at least one atom x different from c
that appears in A∪C ∪D but not inG′, or (2) there is some
atom y in (B ∪ E) \ F ′. Let ℓ = x for case (1) and ℓ = ¬y
for case (2), and consider Ψ = Φ \ {not ℓ}. Since Ψ ⊆ Φ,
rΨ and sΨ are non-empty. We observe that sΨ = A′ ←
B′,¬C′,¬D′Ψ,¬¬E′Ψ,¬¬F ′,¬G′ satisfies c /∈ D′Ψ (for
case (1) recall that c 6= x). Hence, we have c ∈ C but c /∈
C′∪D′Ψ∪G′. As before, condition (γ) of Lemma 27 is thus
violated, and we conclude SE(ΠΨr ) 6⊆ SE(Π
Ψ
s ). It remains
to show thatmods(ΠΨr ) realizes Ψ. Here, any interpretation
I that satisfies ℓ (i.e. where x ∈ I in case (1); otherwise y /∈
I) is a model of rΨ. We take I as the set of interpretations in
which ℓ is true, all f ∈ F ′ are set to true, and all g ∈ G′ are
set to false. Indeed, I contains well-formed interpretations,
since x /∈ G′ and likewise, y /∈ F ′. As before, one can show
that I is Ψ-compatible.
Suppose (b) is violated. We consider Ψ = Φ \ {not¬b}
with b ∈ B\(B′∪E′∪F ′). SinceΨ ⊆ Φ, rΨ and sΨ are non-
empty. In fact, sΨ = sΦ since b /∈ E′. Thus, condition (β)
of Lemma 27 is violated, and, by the same lemma, we have
SE(ΠΨr ) 6⊆ SE(Π
Ψ
s ). It remains to show that mods(Π
Ψ
r )
realizes Ψ. Indeed, any interpretation that sets b to false is a
model of rΨ. We take I as the set of interpretations where b
is set to false, all f ∈ F ′ are set to true, and all g ∈ G′ are
set to false. This is again sound since b /∈ F ′. As before, one
can show that I is Ψ-compatible.
Suppose (b∗) is violated, i.e. we have (A∪C∪D)\G′ 6= ∅
or |(B∪E)\F ′| > 1, butB 6⊆ B′∪F ′. Let b ∈ B\(B′∪F ′).
Hence, there exists (1) an atom x in (A ∪ C ∪ D) \ G′, or
(2) an atom y different to b that appears in (B ∪E) \F ′. Let
ℓ = x in case (1) and ℓ = ¬y in case (2), and consider Ψ =
Φ\{not ℓ}. SinceΨ ⊆ Φ, rΨ and sΨ are non-empty.We ob-
serve that sΨ = A′ ← B′,¬C′,¬D′Ψ,¬¬E′Ψ,¬¬F ′,¬G′
satisfies b /∈ E′Ψ (for case (2) recall that b 6= y). Hence,
we have b ∈ B but b /∈ B′ ∪ E′Ψ ∪ F ′. As before,
condition (β) of Lemma 27 is violated, and we conclude
SE(ΠΨr ) 6⊆ SE(Π
Ψ
s ). It remains to show that mods(Π
Ψ
r )
realizes Ψ. Here, any interpretation that sets ℓ to true (i.e. x
is set true in case (1); otherwise y is set to false) is a model
of rΨ. We take I as the set of all interpretations wherein ℓ
is true, all f ∈ F ′ are set to true, and all g ∈ G′ are set to
false. Indeed, I contains well-formed interpretations, since
x /∈ G′ and likewise, y /∈ F ′. One can show that I is Ψ-
compatible by the usual argument.
Suppose (b’) is violated, i.e. we haveX = A∩(A′\(C′∪
D′∪G′)) 6= ∅ andB 6⊆ B′. ConsiderΨ = Φ\{nota}with
a ∈ X . In particular, this implies a /∈ D′. Since Ψ ⊆ Φ, rΨ
and sΨ are non-empty. In fact, sΨ = sΦ since a /∈ D′. We
observe that condition (β′) of Lemma 27 is thus violated,
and, by the same lemma, we get that SE(ΠΨr ) 6⊆ SE(Π
Ψ
s ).
It remains to show that mods(ΠΨr ) realizes Ψ. Indeed, any
interpretation that sets a to true is a model of rΨ. We take I
as the set of interpretations where a is set to true, all f ∈ F ′
are set to true, and all g ∈ G′ are set to false. This is again
sound since a /∈ G′ (by construction ofX).
Suppose (b∗’) is violated, i.e. |(A ∪ C ∪D) \G′| > 1 or
(B ∪E) \F ′ 6= ∅, as well asX = A∩ (A′ \ (C′ ∪G′)) 6= ∅
and B 6⊆ B′. For this case, we consider the rules rΦ and
sΦ directly. In fact, for these rules, X and B 6⊆ B′ im-
mediately imply that condition (β′) of Lemma 27 is vio-
lated, and we conclude SE(ΠΦr ) 6⊆ SE(Π
Φ
s ). We show that
M = mods(ΠΦr ) realizes Φ. Note that in this particular
case, rΦ has at least two literals not “absorbed” by F ′ and
G′; viz. x ∈ X and some ℓ 6= x from (A∪C∪D)\(G′∪{x})
or from (B ∪ E) \ F ′. If we consider the set M′ ⊆ M of
models where all f ∈ F ′ are set to true, and all g ∈ G′ are
set to false, we observe that for all other atoms y, there exists
at least one model inM′ where y is set to false and another
one where y is set to true. In particular, there is anM ∈ M
where x is false (namely the one where ℓ is set to true), and
likewise there is an M ∈ M where ℓ is false (namely the
one where x is set to true).
Cases (a) and (a∗) are similar to (c) and (c∗): simply apply
Lemma 27 via condition (α) instead of (γ).
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